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• Labour supply and well-being if con-
sumers value consumption relative
to their peers.
• Individuals over-supply labour.
• Some induced to work who other-
wise would not.
• For these well-being is a decreasing
function of wage rates.
• The worst-off are not those with
lowest wage rates.
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a b s t r a c t
When individuals compare themselves to those with the same wage-rate, status concerns – Keeping up
with the Joneses – lead individuals to work who otherwise would have chosen not to, and, for them, well-
being is a decreasing function of the wage rate.
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Dating back to Veblen (1924), there is an extensive literature on
conspicuous consumptionwhereby individuals lose esteem if their
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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average of the reference/peer group and gain esteem if their con-
sumption exceeds the average. It is recognised that this can lead to
a ‘‘rat race’’ in which individuals over-consume, with a consequent
need to fund this extra consumption by either working harder or
saving less (Frank, 1985; Schor, 1998). This over-consumption is
referred to as the Veblen Effect1 or the Keeping up with the Joneses
Effect.2
This paper develops some further implications for behaviour
and well-being when people are concerned about their consump-
tion relative to their peers—taken to be those with a similar wage
rate. It is shown that the Keeping up with the Joneses Effect can lead
people to work whowould otherwise have chosen not to, and that,
for such individuals well-being will be a strictly decreasing func-
tion of their wage rate. Thus those who are least well off in society
are not those with the lowest wage.
1. The model
Individuals are endowed solely with 1 unit of time that can be
spent on work or leisure. There is a tax/benefit system whereby
everyone receives a tax-free universal benefit, σ > 0 and all
earned income is taxed at the rate τ , 0 < τ < 1. Individuals differ
in their productivity which is reflected in their net wage rate ω ≥
0. An individual with net wageωwho spends a fraction ℓ, 0 ≤ ℓ ≤
1 of time on leisurewill end upwith consumption c = ω(1−ℓ)+σ .
Individual well-being is a combination of well-offness, y, and
happiness, h, as given by the function:
w = hθy1−θ , 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. (1)
Here:
(i) Well-offness, y, is captured by a utility function
y = u (c, ℓ) (2)
satisfying the standard assumptions—e.g. concavity.
(ii) Happinessmeasures individuals’ perceptions of howwell their
life is going in comparison to their peers—those with the
same net wage-rate, ω. It is assumed that this depends on an
individual’s consumption relative to the average consumption
c > 0 of their peers, and that happiness is given by:
h = c/c
1+ c/c =
c
c + c . (3)
The two reasons for adopting this functional form for happiness
are:
(a) Happiness is thereby bounded between 0 and 1, reflecting the
way happiness is traditionally measured on some finite scale.
(b) Labour supply decisions depend on the average consumption
of others. If, instead, happiness depends solely on c/c then,
given (1), the average consumption of others would exert
a negative externality on individual well-being but would
not affect behaviour—thereby missing a crucial feature of the
Keeping up with the Joneses effect.3
1 The Veblen effect has also been invoked to help explain the Easterlin Paradox—
Easterlin (2001).
2 This has led to arguments for either taxing such conspicuous consumption or
increasing the rate of income tax – see Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) – to correct
the consumption externality.
3 This is true of the formulation adopted by Boskin and Sheshinski (1978).The parameter θ determines how much individual well-being
depends on relative consumption.4 So if θ = 0 we have the
conventional economists’ story about well-being, and there will
be no Keeping up with the Joneses Effect. If 0 < θ ≤ 1 then the
Keeping up with the Joneses Effect is present, and is increasing in θ .
Combining (1)–(3) well-being can be written as:
w (c, ℓ, c; θ) =

c
c + c
θ
u (c, ℓ)1−θ . (4)
2. Individual labour supply and well-being
Consider an individual with net wage rate ω. The individual
takes as given c > 0 – the average consumption of those with the
same net wage rate – and chooses labour supply (effort) e = 1− ℓ
to maximise well-being,
w (σ + ωe, 1− e, c, θ) ≡

σ + ωe
σ + ωe+ c
θ
× [u (σ + ωe, 1− e)]1−θ . (5)
Let
e = f (ω, σ , c; θ) ≡ argmax
0≤e≤1
w (σ + ωe, 1− e, c; θ) (6)
be the well-being-maximising labour supply decision, and
v (ω, σ , c; θ) = MAX
0≤e≤1 w (σ + ωe, 1− e, c; θ) (7)
the associated indirect well-being function.
The f.o.c. for maximisation is
θ
1− θ ω

1
σ + ωe −
1
σ + ωe+ c

+ [ωuc − uℓ]
u
≤ 0, e ≥ 0, (8)
where the inequalities hold with complementary slackness. From
(8) there is a reservation net wage rate
ω (σ , c, θ) = uℓ (σ , 1)
uc (σ , 1)+ θ1−θ · cσ+c · u(σ ,1)σ
(9)
at or below which labour supply is zero and above which it is
positive. This reservation wage rate is:
• a strictly increasing function of unearned income, σ ;
• a strictly decreasing function of average consumption, c;
• a strictly decreasing function of the weight, θ , given to happi-
ness.
When θ = 0, the reservation wage is just the conventional
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure at
zero hours of work. The fact that it is decreasing in both c and θ
means that the Keeping up with the Joneses Effect is inducing people
to work who would not otherwise have done so.
Since, conditioning on c and θ , the labour supply decision is
a conventional utility-maximising decision, it follows that, when
individual labour supply is positive, it is a strictly decreasing
function of unearned income, while the effect of an increase in
the (net) wage rate is ambiguous, though the compensated labour
supply response is positive. From (8) it follows that when labour-
supply is positive it is a strictly increasing function of c – the
Keeping up with the Joneses Effect – and, consistent with this, is
also an increasing function of θ . In summarywe have the following
comparative static labour-supply predictions in the case where
4 This formulation is consistent with that adopted by Boskin and Sheshinski
(1978).
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∂ f
∂σ
< 0; ∂ f
∂ω
>
<
0; ∂ f
c
∂ω
= ∂ f
∂ω
− e · ∂ f
∂σ
> 0;
∂ f
∂c
> 0; ∂ f
∂θ
> 0.5
(10)
Turning to the indirect well-being function, this again will sat-
isfy the standard conditions, including Roy’s identity, so:
∂v
∂σ
> 0; ∂v
∂ω
= e · ∂v
∂σ
= f (ω, σ , c, θ) · ∂v
∂σ
> 0. (11)
So, conditioning on average consumption, c , for individuals who
work, well-being is a strictly increasing function of the net wage
rate. From (5) and (7) the envelope theorem implies that
∂v
∂c
< 0. (12)
Thus individuals are worse off the greater is the average consump-
tion of others.
3. Nash equilibrium labour supply and well-being
So far we have examined labour supply and well-being for any
arbitrary level of average consumption of the peer group—those
with the same net wage rate. To complete the analysis we need to
determine this average level of consumption. Since everyonemax-
imises well-being taking as given the decisions of everyone else
as reflected in the average consumption of the group, the relevant
equilibrium concept is non-cooperative Nash. Since everyone in
the comparator group is identical, in the Nash equilibrium every-
one ends upwith the same level of labour supply and consumption.
This common consumption is therefore the average consumption
of each group, which implies that for everyone h = 1/2.
3.1. Labour supply
From (6) the Nash equilibrium level of labour supply can be
characterised as the implicit solution to the equation:
e = f (ω, σ , σ + ωe, θ) . (13)
To ensure that there is a unique well-defined Nash equilibrium
assume that:
∀ω ω∂ f
∂c
< 1. (14)
Denote theNash equilibrium labour supply functionby f n (ω, σ ; θ).
Note that it follows from (8) that the reservation wage is now
given by:
ωn (σ , θ) = uℓ (σ , 1)
uc (σ , 1)+ θ2(1−θ) · u(σ ,1)σ
, (15)
which is a strictly increasing function of σ and a strictly decreasing
function of θ with ωn → 0 as θ → 1. The fact that the reservation
wage falls with θ is a manifestation of the Keeping up with the
Joneses Effect since individuals are being induced to work who
otherwise have chosen not to.
From (13) it follows that, when Nash labour supply is positive:
∂ f n
∂ω
=
∂ f
∂ω
+ e · ∂ f
∂c
1− ω · ∂ f
∂c
; ∂ f
n
∂σ
=
∂ f
∂σ
+ ∂ f
∂c
1− ω · ∂ f
∂c
, (16)
so Nash labour supply responses to increases in the wage rate and
unearned incomediffer from the individual labour supply response
in two ways:
5 The superscript c denotes the compensated labour supply function.(i) Increases in the wage rate and in unearned income raise the
value of peer consumption which induces additional work
effort;
(ii) There is a multiplier effect at work whereby changes in labour
supply induce changes in peer consumption which generates
further changes in labour supply.
The sign of both of these terms is indeterminate. However, from
(16) it follows that
∂ f nc
∂ω
= ∂ f
n
∂ω
− e · ∂ f
n
∂σ
=
∂ f c
∂ω
1− ω ∂ f
∂c
> 0 (17)
so the Slutsky–Hicks decomposition still applies to the Nash labour
supply function, and the compensated Nash labour supply re-
sponse is positive and is just the individual compensated response
scaled up by the multiplier effect.
Now, from (8), the Nash labour supply can be characterised
through the condition:
ω

1+ θ
2(1− θ) ·
u/c
uc

≤ uℓ
uc
, e ≥ 0. (18)
So, when labour supply is positive, then, in the traditional case
where happiness does not affect well-being (θ = 0) the marginal
rate of substitution between leisure and consumption equals the
(net) wage. However when happiness does affect well-being,
(θ > 0), the marginal rate of substitution is greater than the
wage rate multiplied by a factor that (a) depends on the ratio of
average to marginal utility of consumption, and (b) is increasing
in the weight individuals place on happiness. This additional term
captures the distortion in Nash equilibrium labour supply induced
by the Keeping up with the Joneses Effect. It is this distortion that
leads individuals to supply too much labour since it increases the
attractiveness of work.6
3.2. Well-being
By substituting theNash equilibrium level of effort back into the
well-being function given in (4) we obtain the Nash indirect well-
being function:
vn (ω, σ , θ) =

1
2
θ 
v˜n (ω, σ , θ)
1−θ (19)
where
v˜n (ω, σ , θ) ≡ u σ + ωf n (ω, σ , θ) , 1− f n (ω, σ , θ) (20)
is the Nash indirect well-offness function. To understand what
happens to well-being all we need to understand is what happens
to well-offness.
If ω ≤ ωn (σ , θ) labour supply is zero and
v˜n (ω, σ , θ) = u (σ , 1) ⇒ ∂v˜
n
∂ω
= ∂v˜
n
∂θ
= 0;
∂v˜n
∂σ
= uc (σ , 1)
(21)
so Roy’s identity holds:
∂v˜n
∂ω
= e · ∂v˜
n
∂σ
. (22)
6 Indeed it follows from (15) and (18) that in the extreme case where θ = 1 then
ωn(σ , 1) = 0 and f n (ω, σ , 1) ≡ 1, so everybody spends their entire time in work.
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(20) and using (18) we get:
∂v˜n
∂ω
= uc

e− ω · ∂ f
n
∂ω
θ
2(1− θ)
u/c
uc

; (23)
∂v˜n
∂σ
= uc

1− ω∂ f
n
∂σ
· θ
2(1− θ)
u/c
uc

. (24)
In the traditional case where individuals place no weight on hap-
piness (θ = 0) then (24) and (23) just reduce to their conventional
forms. In particular Roy’s identity (22) holds. However if θ > 0 a
marginal change in thewage or benefit induces an additional effect
on well-being that is positive (resp. negative) if the change causes
labour supply to fall (resp. rise) and so reduce (resp. increase) the
distortion on labour supply.
In certain circumstances an increase in the wage rate could
actuallymake peopleworse off as the distortion-intensifying effect
dominates the direct benefit from a higher net wage.
Proposition 1. If θ > 0well-being is a strictly decreasing function of
the wage rate for those individuals for whomω ≈ ω (σ , θ)⇒ e ≈ 0
i.e. for some of those who are being induced to work only because of
their desire to Keep up with the Joneses.
Proof. If e ≈ 0 the first term on the RHS of (23) is approximately
zero. Moreover from the Slutsky–Hicks equation, (17), ∂ f
n
∂ω
≈ ∂ f nc
∂ω
> 0 so the only effect of the higher wage is to intensify the distor-
tion and so make people worse off.
Corollary 1.1. The individuals with the lowest level of well-offness
and hence well-being are no longer those with the lowest level of
ability.
4. Example
If the well-offness function is Cobb–Douglas, u(c, ℓ) = cαℓ1−α,
0 < α < 1. It is straightforward to check that
ωn (σ , θ) = (1− α)σ
α + θ2(1−θ)
 ;
f n(ω, σ , θ) =

0, ω ≤ ωn(σ , θ)
α + θ2(1−θ)

ω − (1− α)σ
1+ θ2(1−θ)

ω
,
ω ≥ ωn(σ , θ)
and
v˜n(ω, σ , θ) =

σ α, ω ≤ ωn(σ , θ)
α + θ2(1−θ)
α
(1− α)1−α
1+ θ2(1−θ)

· (ω + σ) · ω−(1−α), ω ≥ ωn (σ , θ) .
(25)Fig. 1. How well-offness varies with net wage.
From (20) it follows that ∂v˜
n
∂σ
> 0 and that, for ω > ωn (σ , θ)
∂v˜n
∂ω
∂v˜n
∂σ
=

α − (1− α)σ
ω

⇒ ∂v˜
n
∂ω
< 0
∀ω, ω (σ , θ) < ω < ω (σ , 0) . (26)
Thus well-offness and hence well-being are strictly decreasing in
the wage rate for precisely the group of individuals that are being
induced to work purely because of the keeping up with the Joneses
effect.
This is illustrated in Fig. 1 in Appendix.
5. Conclusion
When we situate consumers in a social context and their
consumption may depend on that of others, then many of the
standard predictions of the conventional theory of consumer
behaviourmay be overturned.Most strikingly thosewho areworst
off in society are no longer those on the lowest wage. The worst
off will be people with a sufficiently high wage that they are
induced into work because of the Keeping up with the Joneses
Effect. This has implications for the understanding of poverty and
inequality and the design of tax/benefit systems that warrant
further investigation.
Appendix
See Fig. 1.
References
Boskin, M., Sheshinski, E., 1978. Optimal redistributive taxation when individual
welfare depends upon relative income. Quart. J. Econ. 92, 589–602.
Easterlin, R., 2001. Income and happiness: toward a unified theory. Econom. J. 111,
465–484.
Frank, R., 1985. Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status.
Oxford University Press, New York.
Schor, J., 1998. The Overspent American. Basic Books, New York.
Veblen, T., 1924. The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions.
George, Allen and Unwin, London.
